Political thought, international relations theory and international political theory: an interpretation by Brown, Chris
  
Chris Brown 
Political thought, international relations theory 
and international political theory: an 
interpretation 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Brown, Chris (2017). Political thought, international relations theory and international political 
theory: an interpretation. International Relations. 31, (3) pp. 227-240. ISSN 0047-1178 
 
DOI: 10.1177/0047117817723062   
 
© 2017 The Author 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/84347/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: October 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
International	Relations:	2017	Vol	31	(3)	227	–	240		DOI	10.1177/0047117817723062		 	Political	Thought,	International	Relations	Theory	and	International	Political	Theory:	An	Interpretation			Chris	Brown,	Emeritus	Professor	of	International	Relations	London	School	of	Economics	c.j.brown@lse.ac.uk		Abstract:		 The	relationship	between	political	theory,	including	the	history	of	political	thought,	and	International	Relations	theory,	including	the	history	of	international	thought	has	been,	and	to	some	extent	remains,	complex	and	troubled.		On	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	the	mid-twentieth	century	founders	of	International	Relations	as	an	academic	discipline	drew	extensively	on	the	canon	of	political	thought,	but	approached	the	subject	in	an	uncritical	way,	while	political	philosophers	largely	disdained	the	international	as	a	focus.	This	changed	in	the	1970s	and	80s,	with	the	emergence	of	the	‘justice	industry’	based	on	critiques	of	Rawls’s	A	Theory	
of	Justice	and	a	consequent	recovering	of	the	past	history	of	cosmopolitan	and	communitarian	thought.	A	new	discourse	emerged	in	this	period	–	international	political	theory	–	bridging	the	gap	between	political	thought	and	international	relations,	and	stimulating	a	far	more	creative	and	scholarly	approach	to	the	history	of	international	thought.	However,	in	a	social	science	environment	dominated	by	the	methods	of	economics,	that	is	formal	theory	and	quantification,	the	new	discourse	of	international	political	theory	occupies	a	niche	rather	than	existing	at	the	centre	of	the	discipline.		Key	Words:	International	Relations	Theory;	International	Political	Theory;	English	School;	History	of	Political	Thought;	Cambridge	School;	English	School,	John	Rawls;	political	science;	social	choice	theory.	
	
Introduction:		In	the	framing	document	which	initiated	the	Symposium	at	which	the	essays	collected	in	this	Special	Section	were	first	presented,	the	focus	of	the	Symposium	was	expounded	and	a	paradox	identified:		
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‘Classical	political	thought	has	long	been	part	of	International	Relations.	It	is	therefore	something	of	a	paradox	that	questions	of	international	relations	today	receive	comparatively	little	attention	from	political	theorists.	Historians	of	political	thought,	for	example,	seldom	engage	such	questions	or,	when	they	do	engage,	often	criticize	the	way	in	which	theorists	of	international	relations	handle	classical	texts…..	[Such]	criticism	prompts	a	question	of	considerable	import:	what,	if	anything,	does	the	history	of	political	thought	contribute	to	International	Relations	theory?’			The	purpose	of	this	essay	is	to	provide	an	extended	commentary	on	these	propositions	and	this	paradox;	in	what	follows	it	will	be	argued	that	the	framing	of	this	issue	is	broadly	correct,	but	that	once	one	digs	deeper	some	problems	arise,	problems	which	require	a	reframing	of	some	of	the	core	elements	of	the	way	in	which	the	relationship	between	International	Relations	theory	and	the	history	of	political	thought	is	to	be	understood.		The	elements	of	this	reframing	will	be	presented	in	summary	form	in	this	Introduction,	and	then	defended	at	greater	length.			First,	it	is	indeed	true	that	‘classical	political	thought	has	long	been	part	of	International	Relations’,	but	it	is	equally	true	that	the	account	of	‘classical	political	thought’	that	was	customary	until	quite	recently	was,	for	the	most	part,	crude,	caricatured	and	un-nuanced;	this	was	the	case	for	both	mid-century	American	Realists	such	as	Hans	Morgenthau	and	for	early	‘English	School’	writers	such	as	Martin	Wight.				Second,	although	there	is	some	truth	in	the	charge	that	‘questions	of	international	relations	today	receive	comparatively	little	attention’	from	historians	of	political	thought,	it	is	also	true	that	other	political	theorists,	especially	of	an	analytical	bent,	do	not	neglect	international	issues.		Historians	of	political	thought	have	themselves	become	marginalised	in	the	modern	Anglo-American	academy,	and	their	inattention	to	international	issues	may	be	a	by-product	of	their	struggle	to	survive	in	a	hostile	environment.				
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Third,	the	relative	dominance	of	analytical	political	theory	in	the	Anglo-American	academy	is	mirrored	by	the	rise	of	neo-positivist,	social	choice	thinking	in	Political	Science	and	International	Relations;	this	perspective	is	generally	uninterested	in	history	of	any	kind,	but	a	subfield	of	International	Relations	theory	opposed	to	the	dominance	of	neo-utilitarianism	has	arisen,	namely	International	Political	Theory	and	this	new	subfield	is	generally	more	engaged	with	the	history	of	political	thought.				Fourth,	while	the	existence	of	International	Political	Theory	has	stimulated	the	emergence	of	contemporary	historians	of	international	political	thought	who	have	a	far	superior	grasp	of	their	subject	than	their	predecessors	in	the	discourse,	they	draw	an	audience	for	their	work	from	a	subfield	of	the	discipline	rather	than	from	International	Relations	Theory	as	such.		Unlike	their	‘historians	of	political	thought’	cousins,	historians	of	international	political	thought	fill	a	niche	that	it	is	widely	believed	ought	to	be	filled,	but	they	are	indeed	offering	a	niche	product	rather	than	contributing	directly	to	the	mainstream.		Fifth,	in	summary,	we	see	that	a	shift	has	taken	place.		To	oversimplify	the	story,	fifty	years	ago	scholars	in	the	field	were	passionately	concerned	with	the	history	of	international	thought,	and	indeed	with	international	history	in	general,	but	their	account	of	the	classics	did	not	stand	up	to	close	scrutiny.	Now,	there	are	numerous	scholars	of	international	political	thought	who	have	done	the	kind	of	in-depth	textual	analysis	that	earlier	on	was	missing,	but	their	place	in	the	wider	discipline	is	more	problematic	than	used	to	be	the	case.		Just	at	the	point	at	which	expertise	on	the	history	of	international	thought	is	at	its	zenith,	a	knowledge	of	the	classics	is	no	longer	thought	to	be	a	necessity	by	the	most	influential	modern	scholars	of	either	Political	Science	or	International	Relations.		The	rest	of	this	essay	will	fill	out	the	arguments	presented	in	shorthand	above,	but	before	proceeding	to	this	task	it	is	necessary	to	acknowledge	two	limitations;	first,	the	focus	here	is	on	Anglo-American	writers	and	the	Anglo-American	academy.	Anglo-American	in	this	context	is	defined	as	including	anyone	whose	professional	life	is	conducted	mainly	through	the	medium	of	English,	thus	
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including	most	North	Europeans,	but	not	including	most	Francophones.		Very	clearly	a	wholly	different	story	could	be	told	about	the	relationship	between	the	history	of	political	thought	and	the	discourse	of	International	Relations	were	the	focus	to	be	on	France	rather	than	the	Anglo-American	world.		The	two	worlds	are,	of	course,	not	hermetically	sealed,	there	are	post-structuralists	in	London	and	New	York,	Copenhagen	and	Berlin,	and	there	are	utilitarians	in	Paris,	but	nonetheless	these	worlds	remain	distinct,	as	a	cursory	survey	of	the	key	journals	of	Anglo-America	will	confirm	–	over	the	twenty-year	history	of	the	European	
Journal	of	International	Relations,	the	lack	of	material	therein	from	France,	Italy	or	Spain	has	been	a	constant	complaint	of	its	host	organisation,	the	European	
Consortium	of	Political	Research.		Whether	the	new	European	International	
Studies	Association	will	bridge	this	gap	remains	to	be	seen.				A	second,	perhaps	more	important,	limitation	concerns	International	Law.	It	could	well	be	argued	that	many	of	the	issues	which	have	become	central	to	the	discourse	of	International	Political	Theory	were	first	rehearsed	by	International	Lawyers;	figures	such	as	Grotius,	Pufendorf	and	Vattel	are	obviously	important	here,	as	are	early	twentieth	century	figures	such	as	Hans	Kelsen	and	Hershel	Lauterpacht,	and,	in	our	era,	Martti	Koskenniemi	and	James	Crawford.	And,	of	course,	some	figures	who	are	renowned	as	International	Relations	theorists	began	life	as	International	Lawyers	or	legal	philosophers	–	C.A.W	Manning	and	Hans	J	Morgenthau	are	the	most	obvious	examples	here.		The	problem	is	that	to	do	anything	like	justice	to	the	importance	of	International	Law	in	the	development	of	International	Political	Theory	would	require	more	space	than	is	available	to	me	here	–	better,	all	things	considered,	simply	to	acknowledge	the	limitation	and	move	on.	
	
Political	Thought	and	IR	Theory	in	the	Mid-Twentieth	Century		The	history	of	the	discipline	of	International	Relations	–	if	‘discipline’	is	the	right	word	in	this	context	–	is	hotly	contested;	it	is	common	ground	that	speculation	about	the	nature	of	relations	that	would	now	be	described	as	‘international’	has	a	long	history,	in	the	Western	tradition	going	back	to	classical	Greece	and	
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Thucydides,	but	when	that	speculation	crystallised	into	systematic	study	is	another	matter.1		Many	standard	texts	take	1918	as	a	convenient	point	of	origin,	Brian	Schmidt	sees	continuity	between	nineteenth	century	political	science	and	the	modern	discipline,	while	Nicolas	Guilhot	dates	‘the	invention	of	International	Relations	theory’	to	a	Rockefeller	Foundation-funded	conference	that	took	place	in	1954.2		For	the	purposes	of	this	essay,	Guilhot’s	date,	if	made	a	little	less	precise,	makes	the	most	sense:	important	though	the	inter-war	years	undoubtedly	were	it	is	in	the	period	from,	roughly,	1945	to	1965	–	the		period	dominated	in	the	US	by	the	so-called	‘classical	realists’,	in	particular	Hans	Morgenthau,	Arnold	Wolfers,	John	Herz	and	in	the	back	ground,	Reinhold	Niebuhr	and	in	the	UK	by	scholars	such	as	C.A.W.	Manning,	Herbert	Butterfield	and	Martin	Wight,	the	last	two	of	whom	later	came	to	be	seen	as	the	originators	of	the	so-called	‘English	School’	–	that	International	Relations	theory	came	to	be	seen	as	a	distinctive	focus	of	study	upon	which	the	history	of	political	thought	did,	or	did	not,	impinge.	3		All	of	the	aforementioned	scholars,	with	the	possible	exception	of	the	theologian	Niebuhr,	grounded	their	thinking	on	international	relations	in	their	knowledge	of	history,	and	all	made	frequent	references	to	the	canon	of	European	political	thought	stretching	back	to	the	Classical	Greeks.		These	references	present	a	rather	mixed	picture	to	the	modern	reader.		On	the	one	hand,	Niebuhr’s	reading	of	Augustine	stands	up	very	well,	and	indeed	the	depth	of	knowledge	of	the	Early	Christian	Fathers	exhibited	by	figures	such	as	Wight	and	Butterfield	is	very	impressive,	incidentally	underlining	the	extent	to	which	British	intellectual	life	remained	deeply	Christian	in	the	1940s	and	50s	–	one	of	the	most	important	influences	on	the	British	Committee	on	International	Theory,	the	forerunner	to	the	English	School,	was	the	theologian	Donald	Mackinnon.4	On	the	other	hand,	Early	Christian	Fathers	aside,	the	range	of	sources	to	which	these	figures	referred	was	quite	limited,	and	many	of	the	judgements	they	offered	verged	on	caricature,	indeed	actually	crossed	the	line	into	caricature	in	some	cases.				Partly	this	was	a	function	of	the	determination	of	most	of	these	writers	to	understand	international	relations	as	inter-state	relations,	and	to	focus	on	those	
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figures	in	the	canon	who	expressly	addressed	such	relations.	Thus,	for	example,	neither	Plato	nor	Aristotle,	nor	the	Stoics	featured	in	their	use	of	the	canon,	instead	Thucydides	was	turned	to	as	someone	who	explicitly	addressed	inter-state	relations.	Of	course,	the	cities	whose	war	Thucydides	observed	were	not	‘states’	in	the	modern	sense	of	the	term	–	nor	indeed	were	the	Italian	city-states	that	Machiavelli,	another	favoured	source,	wrote	about	–	but	they	were	unproblematically	treated	as	such	by	most	of	the	authors	under	consideration	here.		Wight’s	view,	famously	expressed	in	his	framing	article	for	the	British	Committee,	‘Why	is	there	no	international	theory?’,	was	that	political	theory	is	resolutely	state-centric	and	has	been	since	Plato,	while	‘international	theory’	is	something	different,	marked	not	only	by	its	paucity,	but	also	by	intellectual	and	moral	poverty.5		To	be	an	‘international	theorist’	on	his	account	it	was	necessary	to	address	inter-state	relations	directly.		As	a	result,	many	of	the	authors	who	would	later	feature	very	substantially	in	the	International	Political	Theory	of	the	1980s	and	onwards	–	in	particular	Kant	and	Hegel	–	were	given	very	short	shrift	indeed.		In	so	far	as	Kant	is	read	at	all	in	this	period	it	is	as	a	utopian	thinker;	in	F.H.	Hinsley’s	generally	valuable	study	Power	and	the	Pursuit	of	Peace,	Kant’s	
‘Perpetual	Peace’	is	seen	as	the	last	in	the	line	of	eighteenth	century	peace	projects,	and	read	outside	of	the	context	of	Kant’s	moral	philosophy.6		In	Politics	
Among	Nations	Morgenthau	refers	to	Hegel	simply	as	a	German	nationalist;	Wight	goes	one	better,	referring	to	the	Nazis	and	Communists	as	the	children	of	Hegel	and	Kant.7		Partly	because	of	the	limitations	that	IR	theorists	imposed	upon	their	use	of	the	canon,	there	was	relatively	little	interaction	with	political	theorists	and	historians	of	thought.		In	the	UK,	for	example,	the	London	School	of	Economics	in	the	1950s	and	60s	was	the	home	both	to	leading	British	Committee	members	Martin	Wight	and	Hedley	Bull	in	its	International	Relations	Department,	and	to	one	of	the	largest	coteries	of	historians	of	political	thought	in	the	country,	grouped	around	the	charismatic	figure	of	Michael	Oakeshott	in	its	Government	Department,	but	there	is	very	little	evidence	of	these	groups	influencing	each	other.		Several	decades	later,	scholars	such	as	Terry	Nardin	and	Robert	Jackson	wrote	major	works	of	International	Political	Theory	which	were	highly	
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influenced	by	Oakeshottian	ideas	–	indeed	Nardin	has	become	one	of	the	world’s	leading	scholars	of	Oakeshott’s	philosophy	–	but	there	is	no	evidence	that	contemporary	International	Relations	scholars	in	the	1950s	and	60s	interacted	in	any	meaningful	way	with	Oakeshott	or	his	colleagues.8			If	interaction	between	historians	of	thought	and	students	of	International	Relations	theory	was	very	limited	at	LSE,	in	other	British	centres	of	learning	it	was	even	more	attenuated.		Generally,	in	the	United	Kingdom	both	scholars	of	International	Relations	theory	and	historians	of	political	thought	were	thin	on	the	ground.	From	the	perspective	of	the	mid-sixties	the	major	expansion	of	International	Relations	as	an	academic	discourse	would	take	place	some	two	decades	later,	the	‘Cambridge’	approach	to	the	history	of	thought	built	around	J.G.A.	Pocock	and	Quentin	Skinner	had	yet	to	be	developed	and	the	analytical	philosophy	dominant	amongst	Oxford	political	theorists	was	not	conducive	to	the	study	of	the	history	of	political	thought.		In	the	United	States	the	details	were	different	–		for	example,	in	political	thought	the	highly-influential	figure	of	Leo	Strauss	had	no	obvious	equivalent	in	British	academic	life9	–	but	the	general	picture	of	apparent	mutual	indifference	between	historians	of	political	thought	and	students	of	International	Relations	theory	was	much	the	same.		But	in	the	1970s	things	were	to	change,	both	for	IR	theory	and	for	the	history	of	political	thought,	and	a	different	conjunction	of	ideas	emerged.		
The	Rise	of	the	‘Justice	Industry’	and	of	International	Political	Theory	
	The	starting	gun	for	this	change	was	fired	by	the	publication	of	John	Rawls’s	A	
Theory	of	Justice,	arguably,	the	most	important	work	of	Anglo-American	political	theory	in	the	twentieth	century.10		The	Theory	of	Justice	is,	on	the	face	of	it,	a	work	of	liberal	analytical	political	philosophy,	developing	its	ideas	in	a	chain	of	reasoning	from	first	principles	but	it	also	draws	heavily	on	a	reading	of	Kant	and	of	the	utilitarians.		Though	modern	in	its	analytical	method,	it	is	a	work	of	political	philosophy	that	connects	readily	with	the	classics,	not	least	by	its	ambition	–	this	is	a	book	which	intends	to	tell	us	what	justice	is	and,	not,	for	example,	simply	how	the	word	is	used,	the	latter	being	the	objective	of	most	
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political	philosophy	in	the	mid-twentieth	century.		Because	of	its	scope	and	ambition,	and	also,	it	has	to	be	said	because	of	its	occasional	obscurity,	The	
Theory	of	Justice	is	a	work	that	has	attracted	an	enormous	amount	of	commentary	–	the	term	‘justice	industry’	is	barely	an	exaggeration	–	and	a	great	deal	of	that	commentary	has	focused	on	the	international	implications	of	his	theory.		Rawls	did	have	some	things	to	say	about	international	relations,	and	would	later	elaborate	his	position	in	his	short	book	of	1999,	The	Law	of	Peoples,	but	his	main	contribution	to	International	Relations	theory	has	been	to	provoke	his	critics	to	challenge	his	thinking	in	this	area;11	in	the	process,	a	new	discourse	about	international	relations	and	a	new	relationship	to	some	elements	of	the	canon	of	great	political	thinkers	emerged.		Rawls’s	substantive	account	of	justice	in	society	involved	political	freedom	and	what	he	called	the	‘difference	principle’	which	holds	that	inequalities	can	be	justified	only	if	they	work	to	the	benefit	of	the	least-advantaged	in	society.	His	account	of	international	justice	offers	the	equivalent	of	political	freedom,	that	is	sovereign	equality,	non-intervention	and	the	international	rule	of	law,	but	no	equivalent	of	the	domestic	difference	principle.		From	the	earliest	critical	reaction	to	Rawls’s	theory	onwards,	it	was	generally	agreed	that	this	decision	not	to	produce	an	account	of	economic	and	social	justice	that	applied	to	international	society	was	at	least	problematic	if	not	actually	perverse,	given	the	obvious	importance	of	international	inequality	in	the	modern	world,	and	writers	such	as	Brian	Barry,	Charles	Beitz,	and	later	Thomas	Pogge	made	Rawls’s	position	on	this	issue	the	centrepiece	of	their	criticism	of	his	project.12		None	of	these	writers	was	particularly	interested	in	the	history	of	political	thought;	in	reaction	to	Rawls	position,	political	philosophers	were	increasingly	now	focused	on	the	international	–	indeed	the	case	can	be	made	that	Rawls	was	the	last	in	a	long	line	of	liberal	political	theorists	who	believed	it	possible	to	think	of	domestic	societies	as	bounded	communities	separate	from	each	other	–	but	while	the	new	students	of	global	social	justice	may	have	made	contact	with	the	international	they	did	not	do	so	via	the	medium	of	the	history	of	thought,	but	rather	through	abstract	theorising	and	a	‘presentist’	orientation.				
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Nonetheless,	it	can	be	argued	that	it	was	as	a	by-product	of	the	debates	between	Rawls	and	his	critics	which	focused	attention	on	global	social	justice	and	global	inequality	that	some	important	re-evaluations	took	place	in	the	1970s	and	1980s,	re-evaluations	of	great	import	for	the	relations	between	the	history	of	political	thought	and	International	Relations	theory.		Most	importantly,	the	critics	of	Rawls	revitalised	the	study	of	cosmopolitanism	and	the	search	for	its	roots.	Whereas	a	decade	or	so	earlier	cosmopolitanism	had	been	largely	associated	with	utopian	theories	of	international	relations,	theories	which	had	been	discredited	by	the	triumph	of	realism,	the	cosmopolitanism	of	the	liberal	critics	of	Rawls	located	the	origins	of	their	position	in	the	thought	of	the	European	Enlightenment	and	especially	that	of	Immanuel	Kant,	and,	to	a	lesser	extent	of	Karl	Marx	and	the	Marxist	tradition.	For	figures	such	as	Beitz	and	Pogge	it	was	the	moral	theory	of	Kant	that	was	central	to	cosmopolitan	thought,	and	Kant’s	‘Perpetual	Peace’	came	to	be	understood	as	an	expression	of	that	moral	theory,	rather	than	as	simply	another	implausible	peace	project,	which	is	how	the	previous	generation	of	scholars	had	largely	seen	this	work.13		Conversely,	critics	of	cosmopolitanism	looked	to	the	roots	of	a	more	community-oriented	account	of	political	morality,	and	found	it	in	the	work	of	G.F.W.	Hegel	and/or	John	Stuart	Mill.14		For	both	cosmopolitans	and	communitarians,	the	history	of	international	thought,	and	its	links	to	the	history	of	political	thought	more	generally,	became	salient	in	spite	of	the	presentist	inclinations	of	most	of	the	participants	in	the	global	justice	debates.		The	work	that	most	accurately	reflects	this	new	orientation	to	the	history	of	international	thought	is	Andrew	Linklater’s	Men	and	Citizens	in	the	Theory	of	
International	Relations	which	began	life	as	a	PhD	thesis	written	in	the	International	Relations	Department	at	LSE	(Linklater,	1982).15		Here	Kant’s	cosmopolitanism	is	liberated	from	the	charge	of	utopianism,	Hegel’s	account	of	the	rational	state	is	no	longer	seen	as	a	cover	for	German	nationalism,	and	Marx’s	thought	is	studied	in	its	own	terms	and	not	through	Leninist	lenses.		Many	of	the	judgements	Linklater	makes	in	this	path-breaking	book	have	not	necessarily	stood	the	test	of	time,	but	this	is	a	work	in	the	history	of	political	thought	by	an	International	Relations	theorist	that	represents	a	giant	step	away	from	the	kind	
	 10	
of	caricatures	that	were	on	offer	a	couple	of	decades	earlier.			In	the	same	period	Terry	Nardin’s	use	of	Oakeshott’s	political	thought	in	Law,	Morality	and	the	
Relations	of	States	represents	another	step-level	advance	on	the	work	of	the	1960s,	bringing	together	political	theory	and	IR	theory	in	a	way	that	would	have	surprised	both	sides	of	the	divide	in	the	1960s.		Michael	Doyle’s	appropriation	of	Kant	in	order	to	formulate	an	early	version	of	‘democratic	peace	theory’	is	rather	closer	to	a	caricature,	but	still	finds	within	‘Perpetual	Peace’	much	more	than	did	Hinsley	or	Wight.16		Again,	Mervyn	Frost’s	‘constitutive	theory’	presents	a	picture	of	Hegel	that	many,	probably	most	Hegelians	would	hardly	recognise,	but,	again,	his	work	represents	a	major	advance	on	the	crude	characterisations	of	Hegel	current	a	few	years	earlier.17		What	is	noticeable	here	is	that	these	authors	were	all	scholars	of	international	relations	who	turned	themselves	into	historians	of	political	thought	because	they	wanted	to	say	something	that	they	found	difficult	to	say	from	the	starting	point	of	conventional	International	Relations	theory.	Linklater,	for	example,	was	steeped	in	the	British	Committee/’English	School’	writings	of	Bull	and,	especially,	Wight	–	and,	indeed,	returned	to	these	sources	in	his	later	work	–	but	
Men	and	Citizens	is	not	in	any	conventional	sense	an	English	School	work.		The	result	was	that	these	authors,	along	with	the	critics	and	defenders	of	Rawls	referred	to	above,	in	effect	created	a	new	discourse,	International	Political	Theory,	distinct	from,	though	clearly	related	to,	International	Relations	theory.		More	on	the	importance	of	International	Political	Theory	later	in	this	essay,	but	first	it	is	worth	noting	a	particular	feature	of	the	birth	of	this	sub-field;	if	the	creators	of	International	Political	Theory	are	analytical	political	theorists	and	political	theory-oriented	international	theorists,	then	the	question	arises,	where	are	the	historians	of	political	thought	proper?		It	is	striking	that	there	are	very	few	works	on	the	history	of	international	thought	by	historians	of	political	
thought	published	in	this	period.	One	such	would	be	W.B.	Gallie’s	Philosophers	of	
War	and	Peace:	Kant,	Clausewitz,	Marx,	Engels	and	Tolstoy,	a	short	but	valuable	book	based	on	the	author’s	Belfast	Wiles	lectures,	but	it	is	difficult	to	find	a	second	example.18		Later	on	the	newly-formed	Cambridge	School	of	historians	of	thought	would	produce	important	work	on,	for	example,	colonialism	and	
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imperialism,	but	in	the	1970s	only	J.G.A.	Pocock’s	The	Machiavellian	Moment	is	of	direct	significance	for	International	Political	Theory.19		The	lack	of	engagement	with	the	international	by	political	theorists	in	the	mid-Twentieth	Century	continued	twenty	years	later,	even	as	International	Relations	scholars	such	as	Linklater	and	Nardin	were	successfully	engaging	with	the	history	of	political	thought.		How	is	this	to	be	explained?		
Political	Science,	International	Relations	and	Political	Theory	
	The	rather	unexpected	pattern	outlined	above	is	at	least	partly	explicable	in	terms	of	changes	that	were	taking	place	in	the	wider	discourse	of	American	Political	Science,	in	particular	the	increasing	significance	in	this	period	of	social	choice	theory,	formal	modelling	and	quantification,	imported	into	Political	Science	from	the	disciplines	of	Economics	and	Econometrics.		In	this	period	from	the	mid-60s	through	to	the	mid-80s,	‘political	theory’	became	increasingly	understood	as	formal	theorising,	on	the	explicit	analogy	of	economic	model-building.	And,	just	as	most	economists	have	very	little	interest	in	the	history	of	their	discipline,	so	most	political	scientists	came	to	downplay	the	significance	of	the	history	of	political	thought	and	the	study	of	the	canon	came	to	be	marginalised.	Of	course,	this	was	not	a	process	that	happened	overnight	or	at	an	even	rate	everywhere;	some	of	the	most	prestigious	(and	wealthy)	universities	continued	to	support	the	study	of	the	history	of	political	thought	in	much	the	same	way	that	they	supported	the	study	of,	for	example,	medieval	philosophy	and	languages,	that	is	as	subjects	of	no	practical	significance,	embodying	an	ethic	of	learning	for	its	own	sake.		And,	of	course,	there	were	pockets	of	resistance	to	the	new	learning	from	the	left	in	the	form	of	critical	theorists	such	as	Charles	Taylor	and	William	Connolly,	and	from	Straussians	on	the	right.20			Still,	within	the	American	academy	the	rise	of	social	choice	thinking	was	inexorable,	and	came	to	include	work	in	International	Relations	theory;	rather	surprisingly	and	somewhat	against	their	own	inclinations,	the	structural	realism	of	Kenneth	Waltz	and	his	followers,	and	the	liberal	institutionalism	of	Robert	Keohane	and	his,	formed	the	basis	for	a	social	choice	reorientation	of	this	end	of	
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the	Political	Science	discipline.21		Returning	to	the	focus	of	this	essay,	within	this	new	dispensation	the	cosmopolitan	critics	of	Rawls,	along	with	at	least	some	of	their	communitarian	critics,	found	a	relatively	happy	home;	the	kind	of	political	theory	they	engaged	in	–	liberal	and	analytic	–	was	compatible	with	the	kind	of	formal	theorising	that	was	now	very	highly	valued	in	the	discourse	–	but	the	history	of	international,	as	well	as	political,	thought	fell	out	of	fashion.		Things	were	very	different	in	the	United	Kingdom	in	this	period.		In	the	1960s	through	to	the	1980s	most	departments	of	politics	and	government	in	Britain,	with	the	major	exception	of	the	Department	of	Government	at	Essex,	were	still	largely	oriented	towards	historical	and	institutional	analysis	and	were	resistant	to	the	rise	of	formal	theorising	and	quantification.22		The	study	of	politics	was	largely	understood	as	an	activity	that	fell	within	the	Humanities,	and	in	elite	circles,	in	and	out	of	academia,	the	division	between	the	arts	and	the	sciences	and	the	overvaluing	of	the	former	at	the	expense	of	the	latter	outlined	by	C.P.	Snow	in	his	account	of	‘the	two	cultures’	still	held.23		In	short,	Political	Studies	in	Britain	was	resistant	to	American	trends,	and	to	an	extent	still	is,	although	there	are	now	a	much	greater	number	of	American-style	Political	Scientists,	and	Political	Science	Departments,	in	the	UK	than	there	once	were.			Of	equal	importance	in	terms	of	the	subject	matter	of	this	essay	is	the	fact	that	in	the	United	Kingdom	International	Relations	has	not	necessarily	been	seen	as	a	sub-field	of	Political	Science	in	the	way	that	is	usually	the	case	in	the	United	States.		The	largest	International	Relations	departments	in	the	UK	were	formed	as	free-standing	entities,	established	around	named	Chairs	that	were	not	located	within	departments	of	Politics	and	Government	–	indeed,	most	of	the	largest	Departments	of	International	Relations	are	still	separate	from	Politics	(Aberystwyth,	St	Andrews,	Kings	College	London,	LSE,	Sussex,).		This	has	implications	that	are	not	simply	bureaucratic	or	administrative;	the	self-understanding	of	the	discipline	of	International	Relations	in	the	UK	is	not	as	a	sub-field	of	Political	Science,	but	as	an	eclectic	field	of	study,	drawing	on	the	study	of	History,	Law	and	Philosophy	and	well	as	that	of	Politics.24	This	provided	for	International	Relations	an	additional	layer	of	defence	against	the	
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encroachment	of	American	formal	theorising	and	quantification	–	and	to	give	informal	support	for	this	generalisation	it	can	be	noted	that	those	Universities	where	International	Relations	does	not	have	a	separate	institutional	identity	have	been	most	open	to	American	methods	(in	which	context	see	Oxford,	University	College	London	and	Warwick	as	well	as	Essex).			Put	these	facts	together	and	the	apparently	paradoxical	developments	outlined	in	the	previous	section	of	this	essay	begin	to	make	more	sense.		The	intellectual	environment	of	the	70s	and	80s	was	favourable	to	the	rise	of	the	‘justice	industry’	with	all	its	implications	for	international	theory	because	these	new	cosmopolitans	were	methodologically	congruent	with	the	new	Political	Science.		The	history	of	political	thought,	on	the	other,	was	a	less-valued	activity,	surviving	on	the	margins	rather	than	occupying	centre-stage	in	an	intellectual	world	where	science	was	the	watchword.		The	work	that	was	done	to	create	the	discourse	that	became	International	Political	Theory	drew	on	the	work	of	members	of	the	justice	industry,	but	its	more	conventional	studies	of	the	history	of	international	thought	were	based	in	International	Relations	rather	than	Political	Science,	and	were	disproportionally	British	in	origin	because	International	Relations,	especially	International	Relations	in	Britain,	was	less	focused	on	formal	theorising	than	the	wider	discourse	of	Political	Science.		Interestingly,	while	the	term	“International	Political	Theory’	is	widely	used	to	describe	this	new	orientation	in	the	UK,	in	the	US	university	courses	covering	similar	material	will	often	be	taught	under	the	rubric	‘Ethics	and	International	affairs’,	a	more	limiting	description	of	the	new	discourse	–	the	same	terminology	can	be	observed	in	the	International	Ethics	Section	of	the	(American)	International	Studies	Association,	and	in	the	leading	American	journal	in	the	field,	Ethics	&		International	Affairs		the	journal	of	the	Carnegie	Council	for	Ethics	and	International	Affairs.		In	any	event,	thus	it	was	that	a	new	discourse	emerged	in	the	1980s,	the	character	of	which	is	worth	examining	in	more	detail.		
International	Political	Theory	and	the	History	of	Political	Thought	
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International	Political	Theory	emerged	as	a	distinct	discourse	in	the	1980s,	distinct,	that	is,	from	both	International	Relations	theory,	which	was	becoming	increasing	defined	in	terms	of	causal	theory	and	from	Political	Theory	which	was	increasingly	formal	and	abstract,	divorced	from	the	kind	of	historical	research	that	had	characterised	earlier	generations.		In	short,	from	the	1980s	onwards	three	discourses	existed	in	a	field	that	once	contained	only	two,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	the	boundaries	between	these	three	discourses	were	permeable	and	never	clearly	defined.		Thus,	for	example,	some	‘classical’	realists	who	rejected	the	neo-positivism	of	structural	realism	could	easily	be	seen	as	International	Political	Theorists	and,	at	the	other	end,	as	it	were,	of	the	new	discourse,	analytical	political	theorists	who	addressed	international	issues	might	well	also	turn	their	minds	towards	domestic	topics	–	Charles	Beitz	comes	to	mind	in	this	context,	the	writer	of	a	seminal	book	on	Political	Theory	and	
International	Relations	but	also	of	works	on	democratic	theory.25		Also,	some	topics	were	such	that	all	three	discourses	were	engaged	at	one	time	or	another	–	‘human	rights’	would	be	the	most	obvious	example	here,	and	also	perhaps	the	notion	of	‘just	war’.			Still,	although	the	boundaries	may	be	hazy	International	Political	Theory	does	have	a	distinctive	core,	and	has	developed	a	set	of	outlets	for	its	work	–	most	obviously	the	Review	of	International	Studies,	Ethics	&	
International	Affairs,	and,	more	recently,	The	Journal	of	International	Political	
Theory	(although,	of	course,	good	work	turns	up	elsewhere	as	well).		The	point	about	International	Political	Theory,	which	applies	even	if	the	discourse	were	to	be	more	loosely	defined	than	it	is	above,	is	that	it	provides	a	home	for	work	in	the	history	of	international	thought	that	neither	of	the	other	two	discourses	can	offer.		Initially,	as	noted	previously,	much	of	this	work	came	from	International	Relations	scholars,	but	as	time	went	by	it	became	less	and	less	the	case	that	one	could	usefully	classify	the	participants	in	this	discourse	by	their	origins.		For	those	who	are	keen	on	pigeon-holing,	International	Political	Theory	is	generally	understood	as	a	sub-field	of	International	Relations	but	the	people	who	created	it	are	increasingly	hard	to	classify	and	might	not	think	of	themselves	as	part	of	this	wider	discourse.		Some	of	the	most	interesting	writers	in	the	field	exemplify	this	point	–	Michael	Walzer,	for	example,	is	a	leading	
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authority	on	the	Just	War	and	a	famed	defender	of	a	liberal	nationalist	approach	to	political	communities,	on	both	counts	a	major	figure	in	International	Political	Theory,	but	someone	who,	if	he	could	be	brought	to	self-identify,	would	most	likely	simply	describe	himself	as	a	political	philosopher.26		It	is	also	important	not	to	disregard	some	of	the	less	intellectual	factors	that	lead	to	the	growth	of	International	Political	Theory,	especially	in	the	UK	in	the	1980s	–	Pierre	Bourdieu’s	study	of	Homo	Academicus	may	have	focused	on	French	intellectuals,	but	the	basic	point	that	developments	in	academic	life	are	rarely	simply	driven	by	intellectual	factors	hold	more	widely.27		The	80s	were	a	time	of	great	financial	stringency	for	Universities	in	the	UK,	and	academic	posts	in	political	theory	were	very	hard	to	find;	International	Relations,	on	the	other	hand,	was	booming,	led	by	student	demand	–	predictably,	the	result	was	that	young	scholars	who,	as	political	theorists,	found	themselves	virtually	unemployable	but	who	had	any	kind	of	interest	in	the	international	were	given	a	very	strong	positive	incentive	to	rebrand	themselves	as	international	political	theorists.		International	Political	Theory	was	also	reinforced	by	post-structuralist	and	feminist	writers	in	the	late	1980s,	and	by	early	constructivists.		These	were	sub-fields	of	International	Relations	that	were	regarded	very	unfavourably	by	the	neo-positivist	mainstream,	and,	on	the	principle	that	the	enemy	of	my	enemy	is	my	friend,	they	naturally	gravitated	towards	the	new	discourse	–	in	the	case	of	the	first	two	groups	at	least	this	alliance	did	not	last	long,	but	constructivists	remain	closely	akin	to	international	political	theorists.	More	clearly,	the	rebranded	and	revived	‘English	School’	–	the	successors	to	the	British	Committee	of	the	1950s	–	became	part	of	the	discourse	of	International	Political	Theory	more	or	less	by	default.		English	School	theorists,	by	simply	continuing	to	do	what	they	had	always	done,	found	themselves	increasingly	slipping	away	from	the	mainstream	of	International	Relations.				One	could	continue	to	try	to	delineate	the	new	field	more	or	less	indefinitely	but	the	key	point	is	that	whether	one	wishes	to	think	in	terms	of	a	new	discourse	or	not,	there	is	now	a	body	of	work	in	the	history	of	international	political	thought	that	is	superior	in	quality	to	the	work	being	done	40	or	50	years	ago,	and	which	
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has	found	an	audience	in	the	un-policed	borderlands	between	Political	Science	and	International	Relations.		In	this	essay	the	term	International	Political	Theory	is	used	to	characterise	this	borderland	but	whether	this	characterisation	is	accepted	or	not,	this	work	exists	and	is	read.		In	the	framing	document	from	which	this	essay	originated,	Noel	Malcolm	is	quoted	as	describing	the	standard	(IR)	interpretation	of	Hobbes	as	‘fixed	and	ossified’	and	perilously	close	to	caricature.		Malcolm’s	credentials	as	a	Hobbes	scholar	are	unquestionable,	but	not	so	this	judgment;	in	recent	years	scholars	such	as	David	Armitage,	Will	Bain,	David	Boucher,	Raia	Prokhovnik,	Gabriella	Slomp,	and	Michael	C.	Williams	have	written	extensively	and	creatively	on	Hobbes	demonstrating	that	IR’s	interpretation	of	Hobbes	is	by	no	means	either	fixed	and	ossified	or	anything	resembling	a	caricature.28	Similarly	the	recent	interest	in	the	origins	of	international	law	and	the	so-called	Westphalia	system	has	produced	decidedly	un-caricatured	accounts	of	figures	such	as	Grotius,	for	example	the	work	of	Renee	Jeffery,	as	well	as	highly	nuanced	accounts	of	political	thought	in	the	seventeenth	century,	particularly	notable	is	Edward	Keene’s	analysis	of	the	non-European	origins	of	the	‘European’	states-system.29	Just	war	is	another	topic	which	has	benefited	from	recent	scholarship	both	building	on	the	tradition,	on	which	see,	for	example,	the	work	of	Cian	O’Driscoll,	Tony	Lang	and	John	Williams,	and	subverting	it	by	reading	it	through	the	lens	of	modern	analytical	political	philosophy;	here	Jeff	McMahan	and		David	Rodin	are	exemplary	figures.30		And,	bringing	the	history	of	international	thought	closer	to	the	present,	figures	such	as	Duncan	Bell	and	Ian	Hall	have	done	much	to	clarify	our	understanding	of	Victorian	and	twentieth	century	international	thought.31		The	list	of	fine	examples	of	scholarship	could	be	extended,	but	the	point	is	clear,	there	is	a	lot	of	very	good	work	being	done	in	International	Political	Theory	today,	more	specifically	the	history	of	international	thought,	and	the	contrast	in	quality	with	the	kind	of	work	done	a	generation	or	two	ago	is	quite	striking.	The	kind	of	divide	described	earlier	as	present	in	the	1960s	doesn’t	exist	in	the	same	way	today.	International	Relations	and	Political	Thought	are	no	longer	divided	into	separate	silos	in	the	way	they	once	were;	International	Political	Theory	has	provided	a	bridge	between	these	discourses,	and	–	the	analogy	here	would	be	
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with	the	Medieval	London	Bridge	upon	which	houses	and	shops	were	built	–	not	just	a	bridge	but	also	a	home	for	a	particular	kind	of	writing	that	crosses	borders.		And	there’s	the	rub.	The	very	success	of	International	Political	Theory	in	providing	a	home	for	work	on	the	history	of	international	thought	has	reinforced	the	tendency	of	mainstream	International	Relations	to	regard	this	discourse	as	essentially	marginal	to	its	conception	of	the	discipline.		Here	is	a	real	contrast	with	the	1960s;	at	that	time	the	leading	figures	in	International	relations	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic	were	firmly	committed	to	the	importance	of	the	history	of	international	thought,	but	their	account	of	that	history	came	perilously	close	to	caricature.	Now,	we	have	developed	a	much	more	impressive	body	of	scholarship	on	the	history	of	international	thought,	but	most	of	the	leading	figures	in	the	wider	discipline	have	very	little	interest	in	this	work.		To	put	things	in	the	language	of	contemporary	economics,	there	is	a	solid	demand	for	high	quality	work	that	brings	together	International	Relations	theory	and	the	history	of	political	thought	and	a	plentiful	supply	of	high-quality	works	that	meet	this	demand–	but	this	is	a	niche	market,	no	longer	at	the	centre	of	the	discourse	of	International	Relations.		To	return	to	the	question	that	opened	this	essay,	the	history	of	political	thought	has	a	great	deal	to	contribute	to	the	study	of	international	relations,	and	indeed	is	already	making	a	substantial	contribution	–	but	the	audience	for	this	work	is	relatively	limited,	and	will	remain	so	all	the	while	that	the	high	ground	of	the	discipline	is	occupied	by	formal	theorists	and	quantifiers.																																																												1	See	e.g.	David	Armitage,	Foundations	of	Modern	International	Thought	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2012)	and	Lucian	Ashworth,	The	
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